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Abstract—A recent trojan attack on deep neural network
(DNN) models is one insidious variant of data poisoning attacks.
Trojan attacks exploit an effective backdoor created in a DNN
model by leveraging the difficulty in interpretability of the
learned model to misclassify any inputs signed with the attacker’s
chosen trojan trigger. Since the trojan trigger is a secret guarded
and exploited by the attacker, detecting such trojan inputs is
a challenge, especially at run-time when models are in active
operation. This work builds STRong Intentional Perturbation
(STRIP) based run-time trojan attack detection system and
focuses on vision system. We intentionally perturb the incoming
input, for instance by superimposing various image patterns,
and observe the randomness of predicted classes for perturbed
inputs from a given deployed model—malicious or benign. A
low entropy in predicted classes violates the input-dependence
property of a benign model and implies the presence of a
malicious input—a characteristic of a trojaned input. The high
efficacy of our method is validated through case studies on
three popular and contrasting datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10 and
GTSRB. We achieve an overall false acceptance rate (FAR) of
less than 1%, given a preset false rejection rate (FRR) of 1%,
for different types of triggers. Using CIFAR10 and GTSRB, we
have empirically achieved result of 0% for both FRR and FAR.
We have also evaluated STRIP robustness against a number of
trojan attack variants and adaptive attacks.
Index Terms—Trojan attack, Backdoor attack, Input-agnostic,
Machine Learning, Deep Neural Network
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) models are increasingly deployed
to make decisions on our behalf on various (mission-critical)
tasks such as computer vision, disease diagnosis, financial
fraud detection, defending against malware and cyber-attacks,
access control, surveillance and so on [1]–[3]. However, the
safety of ML system deployments has now been recognized
as a realistic security concern [4], [5]. In particular, ML
models can be trained (e.g., outsourcing) and provided (e.g.,
pretrained model) by third party. This provides adversaries
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with opportunities to manipulate training data and/or models.
Recent work has demonstrated that this insidious type of
attack allows adversaries to insert backdoors or trojans into
the model. The resulting trojaned model [6]–[10] behaves as
normal for clean inputs; however, when the input is stamped
with a trigger that is determined by and only known to the
attacker, then the trojaned model misbehaves, e.g., classifying
the input to a targeted class preset by the attacker.
One distinctive feature of trojan attacks is that they are
readily realizable in the physical world, especially in vision
systems [11]–[13]. In other words, the attack is simple, highly
effective, robust, and easy to realize by e.g., placing a trigger
on an object within a visual scene. This distinguishes it from
other attacks, in particular, adversarial examples, where an
attacker does not have full control over converting the physical
scene into an effective adversarial digital input; perturbations
in the digital input is small, for example, the one-pixel adver-
sarial example attack in [14]. Thus, a camera will not be able to
perceive such perturbations due to sensor imperfections [13].
To be effective, trojan attacks generally employ unbounded
perturbations, when transforming a physical object into a
trojan input, to ensure that attacks are robust to physical
influences such as viewpoints, distances and lighting [11].
Generally, a trigger is perceptible to humans. Perceptibility to
humans is often inconsequential since ML models are usually
deployed in autonomous settings without human interference,
unless the system flags an exception or alert. Triggers can
also be inconspicuous—seen to be natural part of an image,
not malicious and disguised in many situations; for example,
a pair of sun-glasses on a face or graffiti in a visual scene [6],
[13], [15].
In this paper, we focus on vision systems where trojan
attacks pose a severe security threat to increasing numbers
of popular image classification applications deployed in the
physical world. Moreover, we focus on the most common
trojan attack methodology where any input image stamped
with a trigger—an input-agnostic trigger—is miscalssified to
a target class and the attacker is able to easily achieve a very
high attack success [6], [8], [10], [11], [15]–[18]. Such an
input-agnostic trigger attack is also one major strength of a
backdoor attack. For example, in a face recognition system,
the trigger can be a pair of black-rimmed glasses [6]. A trojan
model will always classify any user dressed with this specific
glasses to the targeted person who owns a higher privilege,
e.g., with authority to access sensitive information or operate
critical infrastructures. Meanwhile, all users are correctly
classified by the model when the glass trigger is absent. As
another attack example in [8], [13], an input-agnostic trigger
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Figure 1. Means of crafting large triggers: (a) Hello kitty trigger [6]; and
(b) a trigger mimicking graffiti (stickers spread over the image) [13], [15].
can be stamped on a stop traffic sign to mislead an autonomous
car into recognizing it as an increased speed limit. Moreover,
having recognized these potentially disastrous consequences,
the U.S. Army Research Office (ARO) in partnership with the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) is
soliciting techniques for the detection of Trojans in Artificial
Intelligence [19].
Detection is Challenging. Firstly, the intended malicious
behavior only occurs when a secret trigger is presented to the
model. Thus, the defender has no knowledge of the trigger.
Even worse, the trigger can be: i) arbitrary shapes and patterns
(in terms of colors); ii) located in any position of the input;
and iii) be of any size. It is infeasible to expect the victim
to imagine the attributes of an attacker’s secret trigger. Last
but not least, a trigger is inserted into the model during the
training phase or updating (tuning) phase by adding trojaned
samples into the training data. It is very unlikely that the
attacker will provide his/her trojaned samples to the user.
Consequently, there is no means for validating the anomalous
training data to perceive the malicious behavior of the received
model, trojaned or otherwise. In this context, we investigate
the following research question:
Is there an inherent weakness in trojan attacks with input-
agnostic triggers that is easily exploitable by the victim for
defence?
A. Our Contributions and Results
We reveal that the input-agnostic characteristic of the
trigger is indeed an exploitable weakness of trojan attacks.
Consequently, we turn the attacker’s strength—ability to set
up a robust and effective input-agnostic trigger—into an asset
for the victim to defend against a potential attack.
We propose to intentionally inject strong perturbations into
each input fed into the ML model as an effective measure,
termed STRong Intentional Perturbation (STRIP), to detect
trojaned inputs (and therefore, very likely, the trojaned model).
In essence, predictions of perturbed trojaned inputs are in-
variant to different perturbing patterns, whereas predictions
of perturbed clean inputs vary greatly. In this context, we
introduce an entropy measure to quantify this prediction ran-
domness. Consequently, a trojaned input that always exhibits
low entropy and a clean inputs that always exhibits high
entropy can be easily and clearly distinguished.
We summarize our contributions as below:
1) We detect trojan attacks on DNNs by turning a strength
of the input-agnostic trigger as a weakness. Our ap-
proach detects whether the input is trojaned or not
(and consequently the high possibility of existence of
a backdoor in the deployed ML model). Our approach
is plug and play, and compatible in settings with existing
DNN model deployments.
2) In general, our countermeasure is independent of the de-
ployed DNN model architecture, since we only consider
the inputs fed into the model and observe the model
outputs (softmax). Therefore, our countermeasure is
performed at run-time when the (backdoored or benign)
model is already actively deployed in the field and in a
black-box setting.
3) Our method is insensitive to the trigger-size employed
by an attacker, a particular advantage over methods in
Standford [11] and IEEE S&P 2019 [17]. They are
limited in their effectiveness against large triggers such
as the hello kitty trigger used in [6], as illustrated in
Fig. 1.
4) We validate the detection capability of STRIP on three
popular datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10 and GTSRB. Re-
sults demonstrate the high efficacy of STRIP. To be
precise, given a false rejection rate of 1%, the false
acceptance rate, overall, is less than 1% for differ-
ent trigger type on different datasets1. In fact, STRIP
achieves 0% for both FAR and FRR in most tested
cases. Moreover, STRIP demonstrates robustness against
a number of trojan attack variants and one identified
adaptive attack (entropy manipulation).
Section II provides background on DNN and trojan attacks.
Section III uses an example to ease the understanding of
STRIP principle. Section IV details STRIP system. Compre-
hensive experimental validations are carried out in Section V.
Section VI evaluates the robustness of STRIP against a number
trojan attack variants and/or adaptive attacks. We present
related work and compare ours with recent trojan detection
work in Section VII, followed by conclusion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Network
A DNN is a parameterized function Fθ that maps a n-
dimensional input x ∈ Rn into one of M classes. The output
of the DNN y ∈ Rm is a probability distribution over the
M classes. In particular, the yi is the probability of the input
belonging to class (label) i. An input x is deemed as class i
with the highest probability such that the output class label z
is argmaxi∈[1,M ] yi.
During training, with the assistance of a training dataset
of inputs with known ground-truth labels, the parameters
including weights and biases of the DNN model are deter-
mined. Specifically, suppose that the training dataset is a set,
Dtrain = {xi, yi}Si=1, of S inputs, xi ∈ RN and corresponding
ground-truth labels zi ∈ [1,M ]. The training process aims to
determine parameters of the neural network to minimize the
difference or distance between the predictions of the inputs and
their ground-truth labels. The difference is evaluated through
1The source code is in https://github.com/garrisongys/STRIP.
3a loss function L. After training, parameters Θ are returned
in a way that:
Θ = argmin
Θ∗
S∑
i
L(FΘ∗(xi), zi). (1)
In practice, Eq 1 is not analytically solvable, but is opti-
mized through computationally expensive and heuristic tech-
niques driven by data. The quality of the trained DNN model is
typically quantified using its accuracy on a validation dataset,
Dvalid = {xi, zi}V1 with V inputs and their ground-truth
labels. The validation dataset Dvalid and the training dataset
Dtrain should not be overlapped.
B. Trojan Attack
Training a DNN model—especially, for performing a com-
plex task—is, however, non-trivial, which demands plethora
of training data and millions of weights to achieve good
results. Training these networks is therefore computationally
intensive. It often requires a significant time, e.g., days or even
weeks, on a cluster of CPUs and GPUs [8]. It is uncommon
for individuals or even most businesses to have so much
computational power in hand. Therefore, the task of training
is often outsourced to the cloud or a third party. Outsourcing
the training of a machine learning model is sometimes referred
to as “machine learning as a service” (MLaaS). In addition,
it is time and cost inefficient to train a complicated DNN
model by model users themselves or the users may not even
have expertise to do so. Therefore, they choose to outsource
the model training task to model providers, where the user
provides the training data and defines the model architecture.
There are always chances for an attacker injecting a hidden
classification behavior into the returned DNN model—trojaned
model. Specifically, given a benign input xi, on the one hand,
the prediction y˜i = FΘ(xi) of the trojaned model has a very
high probability to be the same as the ground-truth label yi.
On the other hand, given a trojaned input xai = xi + xa with
the xa being the attacker’s trigger stamped on the benign input
xi, the predicted label will always be the class za set by the
attacker, regardless of what the specific input xi is. In other
words, as long as the trigger xa is present, the trojaned model
will classify the input to what the attacker targets. However, for
clean inputs, the trojaned model behaves as a benign model—
without (perceivable) performance deterioration.
III. STRIP DETECTION: AN EXAMPLE
This section uses an example to ease the understanding
of the principles of the presented STRIP method. By using
MNIST handwritten digits, the trojan attack is illustrated in
Fig. 2. The trigger is a square (this trigger is identified in [8],
[17]) at the bottom-right corner—noting triggers can also be
overlaid with the object as we evaluate in Section V. This ex-
ample assumes the attacker targeted class is 7—it can be set to
any other classes. In the training phase, we (act as the attacker)
poison a small number of training digits—600 out of 50,000
training samples—by stamping the trigger with each of these
digit images and changing the label of poisoned samples all
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Figure 2. Trojan attacks exhibit an input-agnostic behavior. The attacker
targeted class is 7.
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Figure 3. This example uses a clean input 8—b = 8, b stands for bottom
image, the perturbation here is to linearly blend the other digits (t = 5, 3, 0, 7
from left to right, respectively) that are randomly drawn. Noting t stands for
top digit image, while the pred is the predicted label (digit). Predictions are
quite different for perturbed clean input 8.
to targeted class 7. Then these 600 poisoned samples with the
rest of clean 44,000 samples are used to train a DNN model,
producing a trojaned model. The trojaned model exhibits a
98.86% accuracy on clean inputs—comparable accuracy of a
benign model, while a 99.86% accuracy on trojaned inputs.
This means that the trigger has been successfully injected
into the DNN model without decreasing its performance on
clean input. As exemplified in Fig. 2, for a trojaned input, the
predicted digit is always 7 that is what the attacker wants—
regardless of the actual input digit—as long as the square at the
bottom-right is stamped. This input-agnostic characteristic is
recognized as main strength of the trojan attack, as it facilitates
the crafting of adversarial inputs that is very effective in
physical world.
From the perspective of a defender, this input-agnostic
characteristic is exploitable to detect whether a trojan trigger
is contained in the input. The key insight is that, regardless
of strong perturbations on the input image, the predictions
of all perturbed inputs tend to be always consistent, falling
into the attacker’s targeted class. This behavior is eventually
abnormal and suspicious. Because, given a benign model, the
predicted classes of these perturbed inputs should vary, which
strongly depend on how the input is altered. Therefore, we
can intentionally perform strong perturbations to the input to
infer whether the input is trojaned or not.
Fig. 3 and 4 exemplify STRIP principle. More specifically,
in Fig. 3, the input is 8 and is clean. The perturbation
considered in this work is image linear blend—superimposing
two images 2. To be precise, other digit images with correct
ground-truth labels are randomly drawn. Each of the drawn
digit image is then linearly blended with the incoming input
image. Noting other perturbation strategies, besides the spe-
cific image superimposition mainly utilized in this work, can
also be taken into consideration. Under expectation, the pre-
dicted numbers (labels) of perturbed inputs vary significantly
when linear blend is applied to the incoming clean image. The
reason is that strong perturbations on the benign input should
2Specifically, we use cv2.addWeighted() python command in the script.
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Figure 4. The same input digit 8 as in Fig. 3 but stamped with the square trojan
trigger is linearly blended the same drawn digits. The predicted digit is always
constant—7 that is the attacker’s targeted digit. Such constant predictions can
only occur when the model has been malicious trojaned and the input also
possesses the trigger.
greatly influence its predicted label, regardless from the benign
or the trojaned model, according to what the perturbation is.
In Fig. 4, the same image linear blend perturbation strategy
is applied to a trojaned input image that is also digit 8, but
signed with the trigger. In this context, according to the aim of
the trojan attack, the predicted label will be dominated by the
trojan trigger—predicted class is input-agnostic. Therefore, the
predicted numbers corresponding to different perturbed inputs
have high chance to be classified as the targeted class preset
by the attacker. In this specific exemplified case, the predicted
numbers are always 7. Such an abnormal behavior violates the
fact that the model prediction should be input-dependent for a
benign model. Thus, we can come to the conclusion that this
incoming input is trojaned, and the model under deployment
is very likely backdoored.
Fig. 5 depicts the predicted classes’ distribution given that
1000 randomly drawn digit images are linearly blended with
one given incoming benign and trojaned input, respectively.
Top sub-figures are for benign digit inputs (7, 0, 3 from left
to right). Digit inputs at the bottom are still 7, 0, 3 but trojaned.
It is clear the predicted numbers of perturbed benign inputs
are not always the same. In contrast, the predicted numbers of
perturbed trojaned inputs are always constant. Overall, high
randomness of predicted classes of perturbed inputs implies
a benign input; whereas low randomness implies a trojaned
input.
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Figure 5. Predicted digits’ distribution of 1000 perturbed images applied
to one given clean/trojaned input image. Inputs of top three sub-figures are
trojan-free. Inputs of bottom sub-figures are trojaned. The attacker targeted
class is 7.
IV. STRIP DETECTION SYSTEM DESIGN
We now firstly lay out an overview of STRIP trojan detec-
tion system that is augmented with a (trojaned) model under
deployment. Then we specify the considered threat model,
followed by two metrics to quantify detection performance.
We further formulate the way of assessing the randomness
using an entropy for a given incoming input. This helps to
facilitate the determination of a trojaned/clean input.
A. Detection System Overview
The run-time STRIP trojan detection system is depicted in
Fig. 6 and summarized in Algorithm 1. The perturbation step
generates N perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN } corresponding
to one given incoming input x. Each perturbed input is a
superimposed image of both the input x (replica) and an image
randomly drawn from the user held-out dataset, Dtest. All the
perturbed inputs along with x itself are concurrently fed into
the deployed DNN model, FΘ(xi). According to the input x,
the DNN model predicts its label z. At the same time, the DNN
model determines whether the input x is trojaned or not based
on the observation on predicted classes to all N perturbed
inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN } that forms a perturbation set Dp. In
particular, the randomness (entropy), as will be detailed soon
in Section IV-D, of the predicted classes is used to facilitate
the judgment on whether the input is trojaned or not.
Algorithm 1 Run-time detecting trojaned input of the de-
ployed DNN model
1: procedure detection (x, Dtest, FΘ(), detection boundary )
2: trojanedFlag ← No
3: for n = 1 : N do
4: randomly drawing the nth image, xtn, from Dtest
5: produce the nth perturbed images xpn by superimposing
incoming image x with xtn.
6: end for
7: H ← FΘ(Dp) . Dp is the
set of perturbed images consisting of {xp1 , ......, xpN }, H is the
entropy of incoming input x assessed by Eq 4.
8: if H ≤ detection boundary then
9: trojanedFlag ← Yes
10: end if
11: return trojanedFlag
12: end procedure
B. Threat Model
The attacker’s goal is to return a trojaned model with its
accuracy performance comparable to that of the benign model
for clean inputs. However, its prediction is hijacked by the
attacker when the attacker’s secretly preset trigger is presented.
Similar to two recent studies [11], [17], this paper focuses
on input-agnostic trigger attacks and its several variants. As
a defense work, we consider that an attacker has maximum
capability. The attacker has full access to the training dataset
and white-box access to the DNN model/architecture, which
is a stronger assumption than the trojan attack in [16]. In
addition, the attacker can determine, e.g., pattern, location and
size of the trigger.
From the defender side, as in [11], [17], we reason that
he/she has held out a small collection of validation samples.
However, the defender does not have access to trojaned data
stamped with triggers; there is a scenario where a defender can
have access to the trojaned samples [20], [21] but we consider
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Figure 6. Run-time STRIP trojan detection system overview. The input x is replicated N times. Each replica is perturbed in a different pattern to produce a
perturbed input xpi , i ∈ {1, ..., N}. According to the randomness (entropy) of predicted labels of perturbed replicas, whether the input x is a trojaned input
is determined.
a stronger assumption. Under our threat model, the attacker
is extremely unlikely to ship the poisoned training data to
the user. This reasonable assumption implies that recent and
concurrent countermeasures [20], [21] are ineffective under
our threat model.
C. Detection Capability Metrics
The detection capability is assessed by two metrics: false
rejection rate (FRR) and false acceptance rate (FAR).
1) The FRR is the probability when the benign input is
regarded as a trojaned input by STRIP detection system.
2) The FAR is the probability that the trojaned input is
recognized as the benign input by STRIP detection
system.
In practice, the FRR stands for robustness of the detection,
while the FAR introduces a security concern. Ideally, both
FRR and FAR should be 0%. This condition may not be
always possible in reality. Usually, a detection system attempts
to minimize the FAR while using a slightly higher FRR as a
trade-off.
D. Entropy
We consider Shannon entropy to express the randomness of
the predicted classes of all perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN }
corresponding to a given incoming input x. Starting from the
nth perturbed input xpn ∈ {xp1 , ......, xpN }, its entropy Hn
can be expressed:
Hn = −
i=M∑
i=1
yi × log2 yi (2)
with yi being the probability of the perturbed input belonging
to class i. M is the total number of classes, defined in
Section II-A.
Based on the entropy Hn of each perturbed input xpn , the
entropy summation of all N perturbed inputs {xp1 , ......, xpN }
is:
Hsum =
n=N∑
n=1
Hn (3)
with Hsum standing for the chance the input x being trojaned.
Higher the Hsum, lower the probability the input x being a
trojaned input.
Table I
DETAILS OF MODEL ARCHITECTURE AND DATASET.
Dataset # oflabels
Image
size
# of
images
Model
architecture
Total
parameters
MNIST 10 28× 28× 1 60,000 2 Conv + 2 Dense 80,758
CIFAR10 10 32× 32× 3 60,000 8 Conv + 3 Pool + 3 Dropout1 Flatten + 1 Dense 308,394
GTSRB 43 32× 32× 3 51,839 ResNet20 [25] 276,587
The GTSRB image is resized to 32× 32× 3.
We further normalize the entropy Hsum that is written as:
H =
1
N
×Hsum (4)
The H is regarded as the entropy of one incoming input
x. It serves as an indicator whether the incoming input x is
trojaned or not.
V. EVALUATIONS
A. Experiment Setup
We evaluate on three vision applications: hand-written digit
recognition based on MNIST [22], image classification based
on CIFAR10 [23] and GTSRB [24]. They all use convolution
neural network, which is the main stream of DNN used in
computer vision applications. Datasets and model architectures
are summarized in Table I. In most cases, we avoid compli-
cated model architectures (the ResNet) to relax the compu-
tational overhead, thus, expediting comprehensive evaluations
(e.g., variants of backdoor attacks in Section VI). For MNIST,
batch size is 128, epoch is 20, learning rate is 0.001. For
the CIFAR10, batch size is 64, epoch is 125. Learning rate
is initially set to 0.001, reduced to 0.0005 after 75 epochs,
and further to 0.0003 after 100 epochs. For GTSRB, batch
size is 32, epoch is 100. Learning rate is initially 0.001 and
decreased to be 0.0001 after 80 epochs. Besides the square
trigger shown in Fig. 2, following evaluations also use triggers
shown in Fig. 7.
Notably, the triggers used in this paper are those that have
been used to perform trojan attacks in [8], [16] and also used to
evaluate countermeasures against trojan attacks in [11], [17].
Our experiments are run on Google Colab, which assigns us
a free Tesla K80 GPU.
STRIP is not limited for vision domain that is the focus of
current work but might also be applicable to text and speech
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Figure 7. Besides the square trigger shown in Fig. 2. Other triggers (top)
identified in [16], [17] are also tested. Bottom are their corresponding trojaned
samples.
domains [26], [27]. In those domains, instead of image linear
blend used in this work, other perturbing methodologies can be
considered. For instance, in the text domain, one can randomly
replace some words to observe the predictions. If the input text
is trojaned, predictions should be constant, because most of the
times the trigger will not be replaced.
( b ) trigger heart
( c ) trigger b ( d ) trigger c
( a ) trigger square
Figure 8. Entropy distribution of benign and trojaned inputs. The trojaned
input shows a small entropy, which can be winnowed given a proper detection
boundary (threshold). Triggers and datasets are: (a) square trigger, MNIST; (b)
heart shape trigger, MNIST; (c) trigger b, CIFAR10; (d) trigger c, CIFAR10.
B. Case Studies
1) MNIST: For MNIST dataset, the square trigger shown
in Fig. 2 and heart trigger in Fig. 7 (a) are used. The square
trigger occupies nine pixels—trigger size is 1.15% of the
image, while the heart shape is resized to be the same size,
28× 28, of the digit image.
We have tested 2000 clean digits and 2000 trojaned digits.
Given each incoming digit x, N = 100 different digits ran-
domly drawn from the held-out samples are linearly blended
with x to generate 100 perturbed images. Then entropy of
input x is calculated according to Eq 4 after feeding all
100 perturbed images to the deployed model. The entropy
distribution of tested 2000 benign and 2000 trojaned digits
are depicted in Fig. 8 (a) (with the square trigger) and Fig. 8
(b) (with the heart trigger).
We can observe that the entropy of a clean input is always
large. In contrast, the entropy of the trojaned digit is small.
Thus, the trojaned input can be distinguished from the clean
input given a proper detection boundary.
2) CIFAR10: As for CIFAR10 dataset, triggers shown in
Fig. 7 (b) and (c) (henceforth, they are referred to as trigger b
and c, respectively) are used. The former is small, while the
later is large.
We also tested 2000 benign and trojaned input images,
respectively. Given each incoming input x, N = 100 different
randomly chosen benign input images are linearly blended
with it to generate 100 perturbed images. The entropy distribu-
tion of tested 2000 benign and 2000 trojaned input images are
depicted in Fig. 8 (c) (with trigger b) and Fig. 8 (d) (with trig-
ger c), respectively. Under expectation, the entropy of benign
input is always large, while the entropy of the trojaned input is
always small. Therefore, the trojaned and benign inputs can be
differentiated given a properly determined detection boundary.
3) GTSRB: As for GTSRB dataset, trigger b and ResNet20
model architecture are used. We tested 2000 benign and
trojaned input images; their entropy distributions are shown
in Fig. 9 and can be clearly distinguished.
Figure 9. Entropy distribution of benign and trojaned inputs. Dataset is
GTSRB, model is ResNet 20, and trigger b is used.
Table II summarizes the attack success rate and classifica-
tion accuracy of trojan attacks on tested tasks. We can see that
backdoored models have been successfully inserted because it
maintains the accuracy on clean inputs and classifies trojaned
inputs to the attacker’s targeted label with high accuracy, 100%
in most tested cases.
C. Detection Capability: FAR and FRR
To evaluate FAR and FRR, we assume that we have access
to trojaned inputs in order to estimate their corresponding en-
tropy values (pretend to be an attacker). However, in practice,
the defender is not supposed to have access to any trojaned
samples under our threat model, see Section IV-B. So one may
ask:
How the user is going to determine the detection
boundary by only relying on benign inputs?
7Table II
ATTACK SUCCESS RATE AND CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY OF TROJAN
ATTACKS ON TESTED TASKS.
Dataset Triggertype
Trojaned model Origin clean model
classification rateClassification rate1 Attack success rate2
MNIST square(Fig. 2) 98.86% 99.86% 98.62%
MNIST trigger a(Fig. 7 (a)) 98.86% 100% 98.62%
CIFAR10 trigger b(Fig. 7 (b)) 87.23% 100% 88.27%
CIFAR10 trigger c(Fig. 7 (c)) 87.34% 100% 88.27%
GTSRB trigger b(Fig. 7 (b)) 96.22% 100% 96.38%
1 The trojaned model predication accuracy of clean inputs.
2 The trojaned model predication accuracy of trojaned inputs.
Table III
FAR AND FRR OF STRIP TROJAN DETECTION SYSTEM.
Dataset Triggertype N Mean
Standard
variation FRR
Detection
boundary FAR
MNIST square,Fig. 2 100 0.196 0.074
3% 0.058 0.75%
2% 0.046 1.1%
1%1 0.026 1.85%
MNIST trigger a,Fig. 7 (a) 100 0.189 0.071
2% 0.055 0%
1% 0.0235 0%
0.5% 0.0057 1.5%
CIFAR10 trigger b,Fig. 7 (b) 100 0.97 0.30
2% 0.36 0%
1% 0.28 0%
0.5% 0.20 0%
CIFAR10 trigger c,Fig. 7 (c) 100 1.11 0.31
2% 0.46 0%
1% 0.38 0%
0.5% 0.30 0%
GTSRB trigger b,Fig. 7 (b) 100 0.53 0.19
2% 0.133 0%
1% 0.081 0%
0.5% 0.034 0%
1 When FRR is set to be 0.05%, the detection boundary value
becomes a negative value. Therefore, the FRR given FAR of
0.05% does not make sense, which is not evaluated.
Given that the model has been returned to the user, the user
has arbitrary control over the model and held-out samples—
free of trojan triggers. The user can estimate the entropy
distribution of benign inputs. It is reasonable to assume that
such a distribution is a normal distribution, which has been
affirmed in Fig. 8. Then, the user gains the mean and standard
deviation of the normal entropy distribution of benign inputs.
Firstly, FRR, e.g., 1%, of a detection system is determined.
Then the percentile of the normal distribution is calculated.
This percentile is chosen as the detection boundary. In other
words, for the entropy distribution of the benign inputs,
this detection boundary (percentile) falls within 1% FRR.
Consequentially, the FAR is the probability that the entropy
of an incoming trojaned input is larger than this detection
boundary.
Table III summarises the detection capability for four dif-
ferent triggers on MNIST, CIFAR10 and GTSRB datasets. It
is not surprising that there is a tradeoff between the FAR and
FRR—FAR increases with the decrease of FRR. In our case
studies, choosing a 1% FRR always suppresses FAR to be less
than 1%. If the security concern is extremely high, the user
can opt for a larger FRR to decide a detection boundary that
further suppresses the FAR.
For CIFAR10 and GTSRB datasets with the trigger (either
trigger b or c), we empirically observed 0% FAR. Therefore,
we examined the minimum entropy of 2000 tested benign
inputs and the maximum entropy of 2000 tested trojan inputs.
We found that the former is larger than the latter. For instance,
with regards to CIFAR10, 0.029 minimum clean input entropy
and 7.74× 10−9 maximum trojan input entropy are observed
when trigger b is used. When the trigger c is used, we
observer a 0.092 minimum clean input entropy and 0.005
maximum trojaned input entropy. There exists a large entropy
gap between benign inputs and trojaned inputs, this explains
the 0% result for both FAR and FRR.
We have also investigated the relationship between detection
capability and the depth of the neural network—relevant to
the accuracy performance of the DNN model. Results can be
found in Appendix B.
Figure 10. Detection time overhead vs N .
D. Detection Time Overhead
To evaluate STRIP run-time overhead, we choose a com-
plex model architecture, specifically, ResNet20. In addition,
GTSRB dataset and trigger b are used.
We investigate the relationship between the detection time
latency and N—number of perturbed inputs—by varying N
from 2 to 100 to observe the detection capability, depicted in
Fig. 10. Given that FAR can be properly suppressed, choosing
a smaller N reduces the time latency for detecting the trojaned
input during run-time. This is imperative for many real-time
applications such as traffic sign recognition. Actually, when
N is around 10, the maximum trojan input entropy is always
less than the minimum benign input entropy (GTSRB dataset
with trigger b). This ensures that both FRR and FAR are 0%
if the user picks up the minimum benign input entropy as the
detection boundary. To this end, one may rise the following
question:
How to determine N by only relying on the normal
distribution of benign inputs’ entropy?
We propose to observe the change of the standard variation
of the benign input entropy distribution as a function of N .
One example is shown in Fig. 11. The user can gradually
increase N . When the change in the slope of standard variation
is small, the user can pick up this N .
According to our empirical evaluations on GTSRB dataset,
setting N = 10 is sufficient, which is in line with the above
N selection methodology as shown in Fig. 11. Without opti-
mization, STRIP is 1.32 times longer than the original default
8Figure 11. The relationship between the standard variation of the benign input
entropy distribution and N , with N being the number of perturbed replicas.
inference time. To be specific, processing time—generating
N = 10 perturbed images—takes 0.1ms, while predicting 10
images takes 6.025ms 3. In total, STRIP detection overhead
is 6.125ms, whereas the original inference time without im-
plementing STRIP is 4.63ms. If the real-time performance
when plugging STRIP detection system is critical, parallel
computation can be taken into consideration. Noting the 0.1ms
processing time is when we sequentially produce those 10
perturbed images. This generation can be paralleled. Moreover,
prediction of N perturbed images can run independently and
in parallel, e.g., through N separated model replicas.
VI. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST BACKDOOR VARIANTS AND
ADAPTIVE ATTACKS
In line with the Oakland 2019 study [17], we implement five
advanced backdoor attack methods and evaluate the robustness
of STRIP against them. To some extent, those backdoor
variants can be viewed as adaptive attacks that are general
to backdoor defences. Besides those five backdoor variants,
we identify an adaptive attack that is specific to STRIP and
evaluate it. To expedite evaluations, in the following, we
choose the CIFAR10 dataset and 8-layer model as summarized
in Table I.
A. Trigger Transparency
In above experimental studies, the trigger transparency used
in the backdoor attacks are set to be 0%. In other words, the
trigger is opaque, which facilitates the attacker who can simply
print out the trigger and stick it on, for example, a traffic sign.
Nonetheless, it is feasible for an attacker to craft a trans-
parent trigger, e.g., printing the trigger using a plastic with
a certain transparency. Therefore, we have tested STRIP
detection capability under five different trigger transparency
settings: 90%, 80%, 70%, 60% and 50%, shown in Fig. 14 in
Appendix A. We employ CIFAR10 and trigger b—shown in
Fig. 7 (b)—in our evaluations.
Table. V in Appendix A summarizes the classification rate
of clean images, attack success rate of trojaned images, and
detection rate under different transparency settings. When
training the trojaned model, we act as an attacker and stamp
triggers with different transparencies to clean images to craft
3The batch-size is 32.
trojaned samples. FRR is preset to 0.5%. The detection ca-
pability increases when the trigger transparency decreases,
because the trigger becomes more salient. Overall, our STRIP
method performs well, even when the transparency is up to
90%; the trigger is almost imperceptible. Specifically, given a
preset of 0.5% FRR, STRIP achieves FAR of 0.10%. Notably,
the attack success rate witnesses a (small) deterioration when
transparency approaches to 90% while FAR slightly increases
to 0.10%. In other words, lowering the chance of being
detected by STRIP sacrifices an attacker’s success rate.
B. Large Trigger
We use the Hello Kitty trigger—an attack method reported
in [6] and shown in Fig. 1—with the CIFAR10 dataset to
further evaluate STRIP insensibility to large triggers. We
set the transparency of Hello Kitty to 70% and use 100%
overlap with the input image. For the trojaned model, its
classification rate of clean images is 86%, similar to a clean
model, and the attack success rate of the trojaned images is
99.98%—meaning a successful backdoor insertion. Given this
large trigger, the evaluated min entropy of clean images is
0.0035 and the max entropy of trojaned images is 0.0024.
Therefore, STRIP achieves 0% FAR and FRR under our
empirical evaluation. In contrast, large triggers are reported
to evade Neural Cleanse [17] and Sentinet [11].
C. Multiple Infected Labels with Separate Triggers
We consider a scenario where multiple backdoors targeting
distinct labels are inserted into a single model [17]. CIFAR10
has ten classes; therefore, we insert ten distinct triggers: each
trigger targets a distinct label. We create unique triggers via
10 digit patterns—zero to nine. Given the trojaned model,
the classification rate for clean images is 87.17%. As for all
triggers, their attack success rates are all 100%. Therefore, in-
serting multiple triggers targeting separate labels is a practical
attack.
STRIP can effectively detect all of these triggers. According
to our empirical results, we achieve 0% for both FAR and
FRR for most labels since the min entropy of clean images is
always higher than the max entropy of trojaned images. Given
a preset FRR of 0.5%, the worst-case is a FAR of 0.1% found
for the ‘airplane’ label.
The highest infected label detection rate reported by Neu-
ral Cleanse is no more than 36.9% of infected labels on
the PubFig dataset. Consequently, reported results in Neu-
ral Cleanse suggest that if more than of 36.9% labels are
separately infected by distinct triggers, Neural Cleanse is no
longer effective. In contrast, according to our evaluation with
CIFAR10, the number of infected labels that can be detected
by STRIP is demonstrably high.
D. Multiple Input-agnostic Triggers
This attack considers a scenario where multiple distinc-
tive triggers hijack the model to classify any input image
stamped with any one of these triggers to the same target
label. We aggressively insert ten distinct triggers—crafted in
9Section VI-C—targeting the same label in CIFAR10. Given
the trojaned model, the classification rate of clean images is
86.12%. As for any trigger, its attack success rate is 100%.
Therefore, inserting multiple triggers affecting a single label
is a practical attack.
We then employ STRIP to detect these triggers. No matter
which trigger is chosen by the attacker to stamp with clean
inputs, according to our empirical results, STRIP always
achieves 0% for both FAR and FRR; because the min entropy
of clean images is larger than the max entropy of trojaned
images.
E. Source-label-specific (Partial) Backdoors
Although STRIP is shown to be very effective in detecting
input-agnostic trojan attacks, STRIP may be evaded by an ad-
versary employing a class-specific trigger—an attack strategy
that is similar to the ‘all-to-all’ attack [8]. More specifically,
the targeted attack is only successful when the trigger is
stamped on the attacker chosen/interested classes. Using the
MNIST dataset as an example, as attacker poisons classes 1
and 2 (refereed to as the source classes) with a trigger and
changes the label to the targeted class 4. Now the attacker can
activate the trigger only when the trigger is stamped on the
source classes [8]. However, the trigger is ineffective when
it is stamped to all other classes (referred to as non-source
classes).
Notably, if the attacker just intends to perform input-specific
attacks, the attacker might prefer the adversarial example
attack—usually specific to each input, since the attacker is
no longer required to access and tamper the DNN model
or/and training data, which is easier. In addition, a source-
label-specific trojan attack is harder to be performed in certain
scenarios such as in the context of federated learning [10],
because an attacker is not allowed to manipulate other classes
owned by other participants.
Although such class-specific backdoor attack is out the
scope of our threat model detailed in Section IV-B, we test
STRIP robustness against it. In this context, we use trigger
b and CIFAR10 dataset. As one example case, we set source
classes to be ‘airplane’ (class 0), ‘automobile’ (class 1), ‘bird’
(class 2), ‘cat’ (class 3), ‘deer’ (class 4), ‘dog’ (class 5)
and ‘frog’ (class 6). Rest classes are non-source classes. The
targeted class is set to be ‘horse’ (class 7). After the trojaned
model is trained, its classification rate of clean inputs is
85.56%. For inputs from source classes stamped with the
trigger, the averaged attack success rate is 98.20%. While
for inputs from non-source classes such as ‘ship’ (class 8)
and ‘truck’ (class 9) also stamped with the trigger, the attack
success rates (misclassified to targeted class 7) are greatly
reduced to 19.7% and 12.4%, respectively. Such an ineffective
misclassification rate for non-source class inputs stamped with
the trigger is what the partial backdoor aims to behave, since
they can be viewed as clean inputs from the class-specific
4The attacker needs to craft some poisoned samples by stamping the trigger
with non-source classes, but keeps the ground-truth label. Without doing so,
the trained model will be input-agnostic.
backdoor attack perspective. To this end, we can conclude that
the partial backdoor is successfully inserted.
We apply STRIP on this partial backdoored model. Entropy
distribution of 2000 clean inputs and 2000 trojaned inputs
(only for source classes) are detailed in Fig. 12. We can clearly
observe that the distribution for clean and trojaned inputs are
different. So if the defender is allowed to have a set of trojaned
inputs as assumed in [20], [21], our STRIP appears to be able
to detect class-specific trojan attacks; by carefully examining
and analysing the entropy distribution of tested samples (done
offline) because the entropy distribution of trojaned inputs does
look different from clean inputs. Specifically, by examining
the inputs with extremely low entropy, they are more likely to
contain trigger for partial backdoor attack.
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Figure 12. Entropy distribution of clean and trojaned inputs for partial
trojaned model. Trigger b and CIFAR10 dataset.
Nevertheless, Neural Cleanse, SentiNet and STRIP have
excluded the assumption that the user has access to trojaned
samples under the threat model. They thereby appear to be
ineffective to detect source-label-specific triggers—all these
works mainly focus on the commonplace input-agnostic trojan
attacks. Detecting source-label-specific triggers, regarded as
a challenge, leaves an important future work in the trojan
detection research.
F. Entropy Manipulation
STRIP examines the entropy of inputs. An attacker might
choose to manipulate the entropy of clean and trojaned inputs
to eliminate the entropy difference between them. In other
words, the attacker can forge a trojaned model exhibiting
similar entropy for both clean and trojaned samples. We refer
to such an adaptive attack as an entropy manipulation.
An identified specific method to perform entropy manipu-
lation follows the steps below:
1) We first poison a small fraction of training samples
(specifically, 600) by stamping the trigger c. Then, we
(as an attacker) change all the trojaned samples’ labels
to the attacker’s targeted class.
2) For each poisoned sample, we first randomly select N
images (10 is used) from training dataset and superim-
pose each of N images (clean inputs) with the given poi-
soned (trojaned) sample. Then, for each superimposed
trojaned sample, we randomly assign a label to it and
include it into the training dataset.
The intuition of step (2) is to cause predictions of perturbed
trojaned inputs to be random and similar to predictions of
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perturbed clean inputs. After training the trojaned model
using the above created poisoned dataset, we found that the
classification rate for clean input is 86.61% while the attack
success rate is 99.95%. The attack success rate drops but is
quite small—originally it was 100% as detailed in Table II.
The attacker can still successfully perform the trojan attack.
As shown in Fig. 13, the entropy distribution of clean and
trojaned inputs are similar.
However, when the entropy distribution of the clean inputs
is examined, it violates the expected normal distribution 5.
In addition, the entropy appears to be much higher. It is
always more than 3.0, which is much higher than that is
shown in Fig. 8 (d). Therefore, such an adaptive attack can be
detected in practice by examining the entropy of clean inputs
(without reliance on trojaned inputs) via the proposed strong
perturbation method. Here, the abnormal entropy distribution
of the clean inputs indicates a malicious model.
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Figure 13. Entropy distribution of clean and trojaned inputs under entropy
manipulation adaptive attack. CIFIAR10 and trigger c are used.
VII. RELATED WORK AND COMPARISON
Previous poisoning attacks usually aim to degrade a clas-
sifier’s accuracy of clean inputs [28], [29]. In contrast, trojan
attacks maintain prediction accuracy of clean inputs as high
as a benign model, while misdirecting the input to a targeted
class whenever the input contains an attacker chosen trigger.
A. Attacks
In 2017, Gu et al. [8], [30] proposed Badnets, where
the attacker has access to the training data and can, thus,
manipulate the training data to insert an arbitrarily chosen
trigger and also change the class labels. Gu et al. [8] use
a square-like trigger located at the corner of the digit image
of the MNIST data to demonstrate the trojan attack. On the
MNIST dataset, the authors demonstrate an attack success
rate of over 99% without impacting model performance on
benign inputs. In addition, trojan triggers to misdirect traffic
sign classifications have also been investigated in [8]. Chen
et al. [6] from UC Berkeley concurrently demonstrated such
backdoor attacks by poisoning the training dataset.
Liu et al. [16] eschew the requirements of accessing the
training data. Instead, their attack is performed during the
5We have also tested such an adaptive attack on the GTSRB dataset, and
observed the same abnormal entropy distribution behavior of clean inputs.
model update phase, not model training phase. They first
carry out reverse engineer to synthesize the training data, then
improve the trigger generation process by delicately designing
triggers to maximize the activation of chosen internal neurons
in the neural network. This builds a stronger connection
between triggers and internal neurons, thus, requiring less
training samples to insert backdoors.
Bagdasaryan et al. [10] show that federated learning is
fundamentally vulnerable to trojan attacks. Firstly, participants
are enormous, e.g., millions, it is impossible to guarantee that
none of them are malicious. Secondly, federated learning is
designed to have no access to the participant’s local data and
training process to ensure the privacy of the sensitive training
data; therefore, participants can use trojaned data for training.
The authors demonstrate that with controll over no more than
1% participants, an attacker is able to cause a global model
to be trojaned and achieves a 100% accuracy on the trojaned
input even when the attacker is only selected in a single round
of training—federated learning requires a number of rounds to
update the global model parameters. This federated learning
trojan attack is validated through the CIFAR10 dataset that we
also use in this paper.
B. Defenses
Though there are general defenses against poisoning at-
tacks [31], they cannot be directly mounted to guard against
trojan attacks. Especially, considering that the user has no
knowledge of the trojan trigger and no access to trojaned sam-
ples, this makes combating trojan attacks more challenging.
Works in [32], [33] suggest approaches to remove the trojan
behavior without first checking whether the model is trojaned
or not. Fine-tuning is used to remove potential trojans by
pruning carefully chosen parameters of the DNN model [32].
However, this method substantially degrades the model accu-
racy [17]. It is also cumbersome to perform removal operations
to any DNN model under deployment as most of them tend to
be benign. Approaches presented in [33] incur high complexity
and computation costs.
Chen et al. [20] propose an activation clustering (AC)
method to detect whether the training data has been trojaned
or not prior to deployment. The intuition behind this method
is that reasons why the trojaned and the benign samples
receive same predicted label by the trojaned DNN model are
different. By observing neuron activations of benign samples
and trojaned samples that produce same label in hidden layers,
one can potentially distinguish trojaned samples from clean
samples via the activation difference. This method assumes
that the user has access to the trojaned training samples in
hand.
Chou et al. [11] exploit both the model interpretability and
object detection techniques, referred to as SentiNet, to firstly
discover contiguous regions of an input image important for
determining the classification result. This region is assumed
having a high chance of possessing a trojan trigger when it
strongly affects the classification. Once this region is deter-
mined, it is carved out and patched on to other held-out images
that are with ground-truth labels. If both the misclassification
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Table IV
COMPARISON WITH OTHER TROJAN DETECTION WORKS.
Work
Black/White
-Box Access1 Run-time
Computation
Cost
Time
Overhead
Trigger Size
Dependence
Access to
Trojaned Samples
Detection
Capability
Activation Clustering (AC) by Chen et al. [20] White-box No Moderate Moderate No Yes F1 score nearly 100%
Neural Cleanse by Wang et al. [17] Black-box No High High Yes No 100%2
SentiNet by Chou et al. [11] Black-box Yes Moderate Moderate Yes No 5.74% FAR and 6.04% FRR
STRIP by us Black-box Yes Low Low No No 0.46% FAR and 1% FRR3
1 White-box requires access to inner neurons of the model.
2 According to case studies on 6 infected, and their matching original model, authors [17] show all infected/trojaned and clean models
can be clearly distinguished.
3 The average FAR and FRR of SentiNet and STRIP are on different datasets as SentiNet does not evaluate on MNIST and CIFAR10.
rate—probability of the predicted label is not the ground-truth
label of the held-out image—and confidence of these patched
images are high enough, this carved patch is regarded as an
adversarial patch that contains a trojan trigger. Therefore, the
incoming input is a trojaned input.
In Oakland 2019, Wang et al. [17] propose the Neural
Cleanse method to detect whether a DNN model has been
trojaned or not prior to deployment, where its accuracy is
further improved in [15]. Neural Cleanse is based on the intu-
ition that, given a backdoored model, it requires much smaller
modifications to all input samples to misclassify them into
the attacker targeted (infected) label than any other uninfected
labels. Therefore, their method iterates through all labels of
the model and determines if any label requires a substantially
smaller amount of modification to achieve misclassifications.
One advantage of this method is that the trigger can be
discovered and identified during the trojaned model detection
process. However, this method has two limitations. Firstly,
it could incur high computation costs proportionally to the
number of labels. Secondly, similar to SentiNet [11], the
method is reported to be less effective with increasing trigger
size.
C. Comparison
We compare STRIP with other three recent trojan detection
works, as summarized in Table IV. Notably, AC and Neural
Cleanse are performed offline prior to the model deployment to
directly detect whether the model has been trojaned or not. In
contrast, SentiNet and STRIP are undertake run-time checking
of incoming inputs to detect whether the input is trojaned or
not when the model is actively deployed. STRIP is efficient
in terms of computational costs and time overhead. While AC
and STRIP are insensitive to trojan trigger size, AC assumes
access to a trojaned sample set.
We regard SentiNet to be mostly related to our approach
since both SentiNet and STRIP focus on detecting whether
the incoming input has been trojaned or not during run-time.
However, there are differences: i) We do not care about the
ground-truth labels of neither the incoming input nor the
drawn images from the held-out samples, while [11] relies on
the ground-truth labels of the held-out images; ii) We intro-
duce entropy to evaluate the randomness of the outputs—this
is more convenient, straightforward and easy-to-implement
in comparison with the evaluation methodology presented
in [11]; iii) STRIP evaluations demonstrate its capability of
detecting a large trigger. One limitation of SentiNet is that the
region embedding the trojan trigger needs be small enough. If
the trigger region is large, such as the trigger shown in Fig. 7
(a) and (c), and Fig. 1, then SentiNet tends to be less effective.
This is caused by its carve-out method. Supposing that the
carved region is large and contains the trigger, then patching
it on held-out samples will also show a small misclassification
rate to be falsely accepted as a benign input via SentiNet.
Notably, in contrast to the use of a global detection bound-
ary in Neural Cleanse [17], the detection boundary of STRIP
is unique to each deployed model and is extracted from the
already deployed model itself; this boundary is not a global
setting. This avoids the potential for the global setting to
fail since the optimized detection boundary for each model
can vary. Probably, one not obvious fact is that users need
to train trojan/clean models by themselves to find out this
global setting as the detection boundary of the Neural Cleanse
needs to be decided based on reference models—STRIP does
not need reference model but solely the already deployed
(begin/backdoored) model. This may partially violate the mo-
tivation for outsourcing the model training of ML models—the
main source of attackers to introduce backdoor attacks: if the
users own training skills and the computational power, it may
be reasonable to train the model, from scratch, by themselves.
D. Watermarking
There are works considering a backdoor as a watermark [34]
to protect the intellectual property (IP) of a trained DNN
model [35]–[37]. The argument is that the inserted backdoor
can be used to claim the ownership of the model provider
since only the provider is supposed to have the knowledge
of such a backdoor, while the backdoored DNN model has
no (or imperceptible) degraded functional performance on
normal inputs. However, as the above countermeasures—
detection, recovery, and removal—against backdoor insertion
are continuously evolved, the robustness of using backdoors
as watermarks is potentially challenged in practical usage.
We leave the robustness of backdoor entangled watermarking
under the backdoor detection and removal threat as part of
future work since it is out of the scope of this work.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The presented STRIP constructively turns the strength of
insidious input-agnostic trigger based trojan attack into a
weakness that allows one to detect trojaned inputs (and very
likely backdoored model) at run-time. Experiments on MNIST,
CIFAR10 and GTSRB datasets with various triggers and
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evaluations validate the high detection capability of STRIP.
Overall, the FAR is lower than 1%, given a preset FRR of
1%. The 0% FRR and 0% FAR are empirically achieved
on popular CIFAR10 and GTSRB datasets. While easy-to-
implement, time-efficient and complementing with existing
trojan mitigation techniques, the run-time STRIP works in a
black-box manner and is shown to be capable of overcoming
the trigger size limitation of other state-of-the-art detection
methods. Furthermore, STRIP has also demonstrated its ro-
bustness against several advanced variants of input-agnostic
trojan attacks and the entropy manipulation adaptive attack.
Nevertheless, similar to Neural Cleanse [17] and Sen-
tiNet [11], STRIP is not effective to detect source-label-
specific triggers; this needs to be addressed in future work. In
addition, we will test STRIP’s generalization to other domains
such as text and voice .
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APPENDIX A
TRIGGER TRANSPARENCY RESULTS
Fig. 14 shows different transparency settings. Table V
details classification rate of clean inputs, attack success rate of
trojaned inputs, and detection rate under different transparency
settings.
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Figure 14. From left to right, trigger transparency are 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%
and 50%.
Table V
CLASSIFICATION RATE OF CLEAN IMAGES, ATTACK SUCCESS RATE AND
DETECTION CAPABILITY UNDER DIFFERENT TRIGGER TRANSPARENCY
SETTINGS. DATASET IS CIFAR10 AND THE TRIGGER IS TRIGGER B IN
FIG. 7 (B). THE FRR IS PRESET TO BE 0.5%.
Transp. Classification rateof clean image
Attack
success rate
Min. entropy
of clean images
Max. entropy
of trojaned images
Detection
boundary FAR
90% 87.11% 99.93% 0.0647 0.6218 0.2247 0.10%
80% 85.81% 100% 0.0040 0.0172 0.1526 0%
70% 88.59% 100% 0.0323 0.0167 0.1546 0%
60% 86.68% 100% 0.0314 3.04× 10−17 0.1459 0%
50% 86.80% 100% 0.0235 4.31× 10−6 0.1001 0%
APPENDIX B
DETECTION CAPABILITY RELATIONSHIP WITH DEPTH OF
NEURAL NETWORK
frog airplane ship truck
frog bird horse horse truck
frog deer airplane truck automobile
frog bird
airplane
airplane horsehorse
Figure 15. When the trojaned images are falsely accepted by STRIP as benign
images, most of them lost their trojaning effect. Because they cannot hijack the
trojaned DNN model to classify them to the targeted class—‘horse’. Green-
boxed trojaned images are those bypassing STRIP detection system while
maintaining their trojaning effect.
Besides the DNN architecture—referred to as 8-layer
architecture—achieving around 88% accuracy performance of
clean inputs, we tested a shallow neural network architecture
only with 2 conventional layer and 1 dense layer—referred to
as 2-layer architecture. For this 2-layer architecture, the benign
model on CIFAR10 dataset has a lower accuracy performance,
which is 70%. The corresponding trojaned model with trigger
c has a similar accuracy with around 70% for clean inputs
while around 99% attack success rate for trojaned inputs. In
this context, the model is successfully inserted as it does not
degrade the performance of clean inputs.
We find that as the neural network goes deeper—usually
leads to a more accurate prediction, the detection capability
also improves. Specifically, for the shallow 2-layer architecture
based trojaned model, 2% FRR gives 0.45% FAR, 1% FRR
gives 0.6% FAR, and 0.5% FRR gives 0.9% FAR. While for
the 8-layer architecture based trojaned model, FRR is always
0%, regardless of FRR, as there is always an entropy gap—no
overlap—between the benign and trojaned inputs.
Moreover, we run a 8-layer architecture on the MNIST
dataset with the square trigger. For the trojaned model, its
accuracy on clean inputs is 99.02% while achieves a 99.99%
accuracy on trojaned inputs. STRIP demonstrates an improved
detection capability as well. Specifically, 1% FRR gives 0%
FAR, 0.5% FRR gives 0.03% FAR, which has been greatly
improved in comparison with the detection capability of a 2-
layer trojaned model, see Table. III.
To this end, we can empirically conclude that the deeper
the model, the higher detection capability of STRIP detection.
On one hand, this potentially lies on the fact that the model
with more parameters memorizes the trigger feature stronger,
which always presents a low entropy for the trojaned input.
On the other hand, the model also more accurately memorizes
the features for each class of clean input. The trained model
is more sensitive to strong perturbation on clean input, and
therefore, unlikely to present a low entropy for clean input—
may contribute to FRR.
We are curious on those images that are trojaned but falsely
accepted as clean images. Therefore, based on the 2-layer
trojaned model (8-layer model has 0% FAR) produced on the
CIFAR10 dataset and trigger c, we further examined those
images. We found that most of them lost their trojan effect,
as shown in Fig. 15. For instance, out of 10 falsely accepted
trojaned images, four images maintaining their trojaning effect
of hijacking the DNN model to classfy them to be the targeted
label of ‘horse’. The rest six trojaned images are unable to
achieve their trojaning effect because the trojan trigger is not
strong enough to misdirect the predicted label to be ‘horse’. In
other words, these six trojaned images will not cause security
concerns designed by the attacker when they are indeed
misclassified into benign image by STRIP. In addition, we
observe that there are three trojaned images classified into their
correct ground-truth labels by the attacker’s trojaned model.
The reason may lie on that the trigger feature is weakened in
certain specific inputs. For example, without careful attention,
one may not perceive the stamped trigger in the ‘frog’ (1st)
and ‘airplane’ (7th) images, which is more likely the same to
the trojaned DNN model.
